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ABSTRACT 
 
 Many sticky-price models suggest that relative price distortion is one of the 
major costs of inflation. We show that this resource misallocation is costly even 
at quite low rates of inflation. This is because inflation strongly affects price 
dispersion which in turn has an impact on the economy qualitatively similar to, 
and of the order of magnitude of, a negative shift in productivity. Similarly, the 
utility cost of price dispersion is large. We incorporate price dispersion in a 
linearized model. This radically affects how shocks are transmitted through the 
economy. Notably, a contractionary nominal shock has a persistent, negative 
hump-shaped impact on inflation, but may have a positive hump-shaped impact 
on output. Observed persistence in the policy rate is not due to the policy rule 
per se. 
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1. Overview
In this paper we investigate the macroeconomic implications of relative price
distortions as this is where many, though not all, sticky-price models locate the
costs of inflation1. The first thing we do is quantify how costly price dispersion
is in a standard macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and price
rigidity as in Calvo (1983). Despite being very costly in welfare terms, price
dispersion is generally considered to be a term of second-order importance in
linearized models. That is why many economists conclude that the direct impact
of price dispersion on welfare is small (e.g., Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2004).
However, in economies with, say, trend inflation of 2 − 3%, no indexation and a
degree of nominal price inertia, price dispersion, viewed through the lens of our
simple model, will be an important (first-order) variable. Therefore, we develop
a log-linear approximate model which includes price dispersion as a first-order
term. We find that a negative nominal shock under an interest rate rule has an
eﬀect similar to a positive productivity shock, driving output up and inflation
down. But, unlike in the model with no price dispersion, these responses are often
persistent and hump-shaped. We trace these and other surprising results to the
fact that the economy is being perturbed from a steady state that is distorted by
price dispersion.
1.1. The analysis in more detail
In the basic sticky-price model that we set out, private consumption is not
maximized in the presence of relative price distortion (‘price dispersion’, for short),
for a given amount of nominal expenditure. The reflection on the supply-side of
1For example, in the sticky-price model of Rotemberg (1982) all firms charge the same price,
even though that price diﬀers from the price that would have been charged had price changes
not been costly. So, there is no dispersion of prices across firms which is the focus of this paper.
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the economy of that reduction in consumption is that labour is allocated away
from ‘high-price’ firms to ‘low-price’ firms. Due to diminishing returns, average
labour productivity is lower than it would be were all firms facing the same level
of demand. In a sense, then, at the aggregate level the economy uses too much
labour to produce a given level of output. Given increasing disutility of labour,
there is upward pressure on the equilibrium real wage and hence the economy
incurs higher total costs of production compared with an economy with no price
dispersion.
In short, for a given output level, the economy with price dispersion behaves in
a manner qualitatively similar to a low productivity economy, needing to employ
more labour input to meet demand. We demonstrate this argument formally in
Section 3 by forming a Ramsey problem which allows us easily to inspect the
general equilibrium impact of price dispersion. In section 4 we then show that
price dispersion also has an impact on outcomes quantitatively of the order of
magnitude of a negative shift in productivity. We observe that price dispersion is
itself sensitive even to relatively low rates of inflation and increases sharply in the
level of inflation. In section 5 we then enquire, following Lucas (1987), what the
consumption-equivalent impact is of a given level of price dispersion and confirm
that it is indeed very costly. Of course, unlike productivity, price dispersion is not
exogenous and so in section 6 we analyze the impact that price dispersion has on
the optimal monetary policy. We recover a result like Yun’s (2005), demonstrating
that in the presence of price dispersion, disinflation may be the optimal policy.
Typically, linearized models do not come to that conclusion as price dispersion is
absent from these models. We indicate why even a full second-order approximation
to our model’s equations would not recover Yun’s or our result and would continue
to conclude that the impact of price dispersion on welfare is quantitatively very
small.
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In order to analyze the impact of price dispersion on dynamics, in sections 7
and 8 we develop our linearized model around a non-indexed, inflationary steady-
state2; as a result, price dispersion is of first-order significance. We simply take as
given that trend inflation is positive. We find that the impact of a persistent,
negative nominal shock appears similar to a persistent, positive productivity
shock, which is consistent with our analysis in sections 3 and 4. However, there
is a marked diﬀerence between the models with and without price dispersion: We
find that inflation follows a hump-shaped response following both a nominal and
real shocks in the model with price dispersion; its maximal response is not in the
period following the shock. Interest rates also respond more gradually following
shocks in the model with price dispersion. Underlying these results is the fact
that any shock which decreases price dispersion will impart upward momentum
to output and downward momentum to inflation, and because price dispersion is
a persistent process, this momentum will itself be persistent. Section 9 oﬀers some
conclusions.
2. The Model
In this section we present a standard sticky-price model. There are a large number
of identical agents in the economy who evaluate their utility in accordance with
the following criterion:
E0
∞X
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt(i)) ≡ E0
∞X
t=0
βt
µ
log(Ct)−
λt
1 + v
Z
i
N1+vt (i)di
¶
. (2.1)
2Some recent contributions have incorporated indexation of some prices as a means to impart
peristence into inflation. However, as Blanchard and Gali (2005) note, there is probably little
empirical justification for this assumption in low inflation economies. Indexing in this manner
also seems to make price dispersion a second-order term.
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Et denotes the expectations operator at time t, β is the discount factor, Ct is
consumption and Nt(i) is the quantity of labour supplied to firm i; labour is firm
specific. υ ≥ 0 measures the labour supply elasticity while λt is a ‘preference’
parameter.
Consumption is defined over a basket of goods and indexed by i, in the manner
of Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz
Ct ≡
∙Z 1
0
ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
¸ θ
θ−1
. (2.2)
The average price-level, Pt, is known to be
Pt =
∙Z 1
0
pt(i)1−θdi
¸ 1
1−θ
. (2.3)
The demand for each good is given by
Yt(i) =
µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶−θ
Y dt , (2.4)
where pt(i) is the nominal price of the final good produced by firm i and Y dt
denotes aggregate demand. We assume that the labour market is such that all
the firms pay the same real wage for the same labour. As a result, we may write
wt(i) = wt, ∀i. Further, as in Benigno and Woodford (2003), all households
provide the same share of labour to all firms. It follows that we may write the
agent’s flow budget constraint asZ 1
0
pt(i)ct(i)di+Bt = [1 + it−1]Bt−1 +WtNt(1− τht ) +Πt. (2.5)
As all agents are identical, the only financial assets traded in equilibrium will be
those issued by the fiscal authority. Here Bt denotes the nominal value at the
end of date t of government bond holdings, 1 + it is the nominal interest rate on
this ‘riskless’ one-period nominal asset, Wt is the nominal wage in period t, and
Πt is profits remitted to the individual. We denote the tax rate applied to labour
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income by τht . We also impose the following familiar restriction on the equilibrium
plan of the representative agent:
lim
J→∞
Et
JY
j=0
Rt+j−1Bt+J ≥ 0, Rt ≡ (1 + it)−1 . (2.6)
Hence, the necessary conditions for an optimum include:
Nt =
£
wt
¡
1− τht
¢
(λtCt)
−1¤1/v ; (2.7)
and
Et
½
βCt
Ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
¾
=
1
1 + it
. (2.8)
The complete markets assumption implies the existence of a unique stochastic
discount factor,
Qt,t+k = β
CtPt
Ct+kPt+k
(2.9)
where
Et {Qt,t+k} = Et
kY
j=0
1
1 + it+j
.
2.1. Representative firm: factor demand
Labour is the only factor of production. Firms are monopolistic competitors who
produce their distinctive goods according to the following technology
Yt(i) = At [Nt(i)]
1/φ , (2.10)
where Nt(i) denotes the amount of labour hired by firm i in period t, At is a
stochastic productivity shock and φ > 1.
The demand for output determines the demand for labour. Hence we find that
Nt(i) =
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶−θφµ Yt
At
¶φ
. (2.11)
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It follows that the total amount of labour demanded will be
Nt =
Z
Nt(i)di =
µ
Yt
At
¶φ Z µPt(i)
Pt
¶−θφ
di = N∗t∆t h−θφi , (2.12)
where we define ∆t h−θφi ≡ ∆t as our measure of price dispersion:
∆t =
Z 1
0
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶−θφ
di. (2.13)
From an empirical point of view this is not a natural measure of price dispersion
and so in section 4.1 we shall map this into the coeﬃcient of variation for prices.
In this simple set-up, as we confirm below, were all firms given the chance to
re-price at any instant in time, they would all choose the same price. In that case,
if all prices are similar, then for a given level of output the labour supply would
be
N∗t =
¡
A−1t Yt
¢φ
. (2.14)
If we substitute (2.14) into (2.12) we receive
Nt =
³
A−φt ∆t
´
Y φt . (2.15)
This corresponds to the amount of labour which would be employed to produce
quantity Yt should prices not be equal across industries. Finally, it follows that
the equilibrium wage can be written as
wt = λt
1
1− τht
Ct∆
v
t
µ
Yt
At
¶φv
. (2.16)
2.2. Representative firm: price setting
We adopt the Calvo (1983) approach to price-stickiness. This is a convenient and
familiar approach to modelling sticky prices but the same basic issues that we are
interested in would seem to arise in any model where price dispersion is present.
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Each period a measure, 1 − α, of firms is allowed to adjust prices. Those firms
choose the nominal price which maximizes their expected profit given that they
may have to charge the same price in k−periods time with probability αk.
Importantly, we are assuming that firms are cost-takers and that they do
not anticipate the change in equilibrium wages in reaction to their price setting
decision, evident from (2.16). The price setting problem can then be characterized
as follows:
max
p0t
Et
∞X
k=0
αkQt,t+k
Ã
Yt+k
µ
p0t
Pt+k
¶1−θ
− wt+kA−φt+kY
φ
t+k
µ
p0t
Pt+k
¶−θφ!
, (2.17)
where p0t is the price chosen by firms which update prices. There is no need to
index this nominal price on i as it is clear that this will be a function solely of
variables that aﬀect all firms symmetrically. The first order condition with respect
to p0t impliesµ
p0t
Pt
¶1+θ(φ−1)
=
µ
θ
θ − 1
¶P∞
k=0(αβ)
kEtC−1t+k
h
φwt+kA
−φ
t+kY
φ
t+k(Pt/Pt+k)
−θφ
i
P∞
k=0(αβ)
kEtC
−1
t+k [Yt+k(Pt/Pt+k)
1−θ]
.
(2.18)
The price index then evolves according to the law of motion
Pt =
£
(1− α) p01−θt + αP 1−θt−1
¤1/(1−θ)
. (2.19)
Because the relative prices of the firms that do not change their prices in period
t fall by the rate of inflation, we may derive a law of motion for our measure of
price dispersion,
∆t = α∆t−1π
θφ
t + (1− α)
µ
p0t
Pt
¶−θφ
. (2.20)
2.3. Fiscal Authorities
The government purchases goods in the same proportions as do private agents.
These purchases yield no utility to agents nor do they boost the productive
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potential of the economy. Further, government expenditure is assumed exogenous
and stochastic. For now, we assume that government raises revenue solely through
taxes on labour income. We assume that the government can borrow by issuing a
one period risk-free nominal bond. The nominal value of government debt evolves
according to the law of motion
Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 − St. (2.21)
Bt and it were defined above, and St is the (primary) budget surplus,
St = τhtWtNt −GtPt.
We assume that the expected path of government surpluses satisfies an
intertemporal solvency condition, by design, for all feasible paths of the model’s
endogenous variables. There is a sequence of intertemporal constraints for all t of
the following sort,
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 = Et
∞X
k=0
Qt,t+k (St+k) , (2.22)
which we can simplify as
(1 + it−1)
bt−1
Ctπt
= Et
∞X
k=0
βk
1
Ct+k
¡
τht+kwt+kNt+k −Gt+k
¢
, (2.23)
and where bt−1 is a measure of the real value of debt inherited from the previous
period, bt−1 = Bt−1/Pt−1, while πt is inflation, πt = Pt/Pt−1.
Associated with this sequence, is a sequence of transversality conditions. This
sequence is ultimately related to the incompleteness of (government debt) markets
(see Hahn, 1971). Finally, there is an economy-wide resource constraint such that
total output is equal to (private plus government) consumption:
Yt = Ct +Gt. (2.24)
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2.4. A policy problem
We now formulate the policy problem as a search for the best macroeconomic
policy for a competitive equilibrium defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of
plans,
©
Ct+k, Yt+k, Nt+k, wt+k,∆t+k,Bt+k, p0t+k, Pt+k,
ª∞
k=0
, given initial conditions,
{bt−1, it−1,∆t−1, Pt−1} , and expected dynamics of future policy variables,
{EtPt+k, Etτ t+k, }∞k=0 , and exogenous shocks, {EtAt+k, EtGt+k, Etλt+k}∞k=0 , and
satisfying conditions (2.15), (2.16), (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), (2.23) and (2.24).
We are now able to set out the Ramsey problem in Proposition 2.1:
Proposition 2.1 The Ramsey plan is a choice of state contingent paths for
the endogenous variables
©
Pt+k, Ct+k,∆t+k, τht+k,
ª∞
k=0
from date t onwards given
{EtAt+k, EtGt+k, Etλt+k, bt−1, it−1,∆t−1, Pt−1}∞k=0 so as to maximize social welfare
function (2.25) subject to constraints (2.26)-(2.28):
maxEt
∞X
k=0
βk
Ã
log (Ct+k)− λt+k∆v+1t+k
¡
A−1t (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φ
v + 1
!
; (2.25)
subject to:
• Solvency Constraint
(1 + it−1)
bt−1
Ctπt
(2.26)
= Et
∞X
k=0
βk
µ
τht+k
1− τht+k
λt+k∆
v+1
t+k
¡
A−1t+k (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φ − Gt+k
Ct+k
¶
;
• Phillips Curveµ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ
Et
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
Ct+k +Gt+k
Ct+k
µ
Pt
Pt+k
¶1−θ
(2.27)
=
θ
(1− θ)φEt
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
λt+k
1− τht+k
∆vt+k
¡
A−1t+k (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φµ Pt
Pt+k
¶−θφ
;
10
• Law of Motion of Prices
∆t = α∆t−1π
θφ
t + (1− α)
µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶ θφ
θ−1
. (2.28)
Proof. See Appendix.
The foregoing formulation of the policy problem brings out very clearly the
impact of price dispersion and the sense in which its impact is like a drag
on the level of factor productivity. Indeed, the following change of variables,
ARt := At∆
− 1φ
t , demonstrates that any degree of price dispersion greater than unity
impacts in the utility function and the solvency constraint exactly like a downward
shift in the level of productivity; as proposition 3.1 below establishes, ∆t ≥ 1.
This change of variables does not quite work in the Phillips curve where price
dispersion enters as ∆vt (as opposed to ∆
v+1
t in the utility function and solvency
constraint). One may be tempted to conclude that this simply points to the fact
that optimal monetary policy ought to ensure that price dispersion is minimized,
or set to zero (i.e., perfect price-level stability). However, in an appendix available
from the authors, we demonstrate that this analogy between price dispersion and
productivity shocks goes through when one incorporates nominal wage stickiness
in the manner of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). This is important since in
the presence of more than one source of nominal rigidity some systematic deviation
from price stability will in general be optimal. Additionally, if we derive a log-
linear approximation to this model economy around a non-zero inflation steady
state then we shall find that in general a policy of ensuring perfect price stability
will not be part of a Ramsey program. We pursue this issue further in section 6.
We also note, in passing, that price dispersion also bears a close similarity
to a preference shift into leisure. If we employ the following change of variables,
λRt := λt∆
v+1
t , we see that the problem facing the policymaker is almost identical
11
to that facing a policymaker in an economy with a higher preference for leisure.
Again, this change of variables does not quite work in the Phillips relation; here
the price dispersion term enters in a less quantitatively significant way: ∆vt+k, ∀k,
as opposed to ∆v+1t+k , ∀k. We prefer to emphasize the similarity between price
dispersion and productivity since in the appendix to which we have just referred,
we show that in the presence of nominal wage rigidity the wage dispersion term
in naturally ‘paired’ with the preference shifter while the price dispersion term is
naturally linked, as above, with productivity.
We return to the implications for price dispersion of this policy problem in
section 6. First, we investigate the quantitative impact of price dispersion in the
model.
3. The Costs of Price Dispersion
We begin by establishing the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Price dispersion is always greater than or equal to one, ∆t ≥ 1,
while equality can only happen when all prices are equal.
Proof. This is a consequence of Jensen’s inequality. We need to demonstrate
that ∆t hxi > 1, for x = −θφ. For this purpose we will use Jensen’s inequality
that f
¡R
uidi
¢
≤
R
f (ui) di which holds for any convex function, f . Consider
f (u) = u
x
1−θ , and ui =
³
pt(i)
Pt
´1−θ
. We can easily show that f (u) is convex for
x < 1 − θ, since f 00 (u) =
¡
1
1−θ
¢2
x (x− 1 + θ)u x1−θ−2 > 0. Now we can apply
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Jensen’s inequality
f
µZ
uidi
¶
= f
ÃZ µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶1−θ
di
!
= f(1) = 1
≤
Z
f
"µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶1−θ#
di =
Z Ãµ
pt(i)
Pt
¶1−θ! x1−θ
di =
Z µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶x
di
= ∆t hxi
In our particular case x = −θφ < −θ < 1− θ, since φ ≥ 1.
3.1. Higher Production Costs
We now demonstrate Proposition 3.2 which establishes that rising price dispersion,
ceteris paribus, increases marginal production costs and distorts the demand for
and supply of labour.
Proposition 3.2. At the economy-wide level, for a given output level
(i) the labour input employed;
(ii) the aggregate production costs;
(iii) the disutility from labour,
all increase in price dispersion.
Proof. The proof of (i) follows immediately from (2.15)
Not surprisingly, total production costs are increasing in labour employed.
Combining (2.15) with (2.16) we can calculate total production costs
TCt := wtNt = µtλt
1
1− τht
Ct
³
A−φt Y
φ
t ∆t
´1+v
. (3.1)
It follows immediately that [∂TCt/∂∆t] > 0.
Finally, the higher is employment the less time households have for leisure.
The aggregate disutility from labour, for a given level of output, is given in (3.2)
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and it is clear that this also is increasing in price dispersion.
λt
1
1 + v
N1+vt = λt
1
1 + v
³
A−φt Y
φ
t ∆t
´1+v
. (3.2)
The implications of this proposition will be useful in interpreting the impulse
responses that we report in Section 8.
4. Price Dispersion and Productivity shocks: Some Back-
of-the-Envelope Calculations
4.1. Theoretical Calculations
We can use the law of motion (2.28) to make some inference on the impact of
price dispersion. We do this by mapping a given average level of inflation, via its
impact on price dispersion, into an equivalent decrease in productivity using the
change of variable deduced above. This is shown in the bottom line of Table 4.13.
That is, we use the following expression:
∆t = ∆t−1 = (1− α)
µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶ θφ
θ−1
/
³
1− απθφt
´
. (4.1)
In Table 4.1 column I corresponds to a benchmark economy, while column II
shows that a higher level of competition, θ, makes price dispersion more costly, as
does, respectively, the degree of concavity of the production function, φ, (column
III), inflation, πt, (column IV ) and the degree of price stickiness, α (column V ).
The final row in the figure, under the maintained assumptions, maps a given degree
of price dispersion into an equivalent percentage decrease in productivity. These
numbers, and those in subsequent tables, are in terms of annualized percentage
3The values for the parameters in column I in this table and in the subsequent tables
correspond to those we used in conducting the simulations reported in Section 8. These appear
to be in line with much of the literature.
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decreases. It is striking that a steady-state inflation rate of 2.5% maps into an
almost equivalent (2.4%) decrease in factor productivity in the base case (column
I ).
Table 4.1 I II III IV V
θ 7 10 7 7 7
φ 1.38 1.38 1.6 1.38 1.38
π 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5% 2.5%
α 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
∆ 1.034 1.09 1.06 1.28 1.08
1−∆−1/φ -2.4% -5.8% -3.6% -16.6% -5.4%
However, an obvious question follows from this simple analysis: How large
is price dispersion in the data? Unfortunately, so far as we are aware, there
is little direct empirical guidance on this issue, although there is some general
evidence on price dispersion. For instance, Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004)
calculate the coeﬃcient of variation (cvar) for online products in the USA. They
find it equals 10% on average. And it may well be the case that the coeﬃcient of
variation could be significantly larger in European countries. Gatti and Kattuman
(2003), for example, find that the coeﬃcient of variation for online products in the
Netherlands is 12.6%, although they also report that the coeﬃcient of variation for
online bookstores can be up to 30%. We can, in fact, map these numbers into our
productivity equivalent measure, making no assumptions about trend inflation.
We recall the definition of the coeﬃcient of variation:
cvar =
³R
p2(i)di−
¡R
p(i)di
¢2´1/2R
p(i)di
=
=
µR ³p(i)
P
´2
di−
³R p(i)
P di
´2¶1/2
R p(i)
P di
.
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In the appendix we show how one can relate this measure to our model’s
measure of price dispersion to arrive at the following expression:
∆ ' 1 + 1
2
θφ
θ + 1
(θφ− θ + 1) cvar
2
1− 1
2
θ
θ+1 (cvar
2 + 1)
. (4.2)
Applying formula (4.2) we can estimate the eﬀect of price dispersion in terms
of productivity permitting the coeﬃcient of variation to go from 5% to 20% (recall
the studies above suggest a range of something like 10% to 30%). The results are
reported in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 I II III IV V
cvar 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
θ 7 7 10 7 7
φ 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.6 1.38
∆ 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.16
1−∆−1/φ -0.7% -2.7% -3.8% -3.9% -10.3%
Interestingly, column II in Table 4.2 corresponds quite closely to column I
in Table 4.1, in terms of the ultimate productivity-equivalent impact, suggesting
that a coeﬃcient of variation of 10%, or a little lower, may be a realistic number.
And we emphasize, we made no assumption about inflation in constructing Table
4.2. Taken together, the complementary evidence in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate
that an empirically plausible level of price dispersion is a potentially very costly
in welfare terms. We may ask the question, in the spirit of Lucas (1987), how
costly in terms of utility a given degree of price dispersion might be.
5. The Consumption Equivalent Cost of price Dispersion
We will compare two economies; one corresponding to the situation when all firms
charge the same price, the other with a degree of price dispersion corresponding
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to what we hope are reasonable levels for actual price dispersion. Due to price
dispersion, households in the second economy would work more, and, ceteris
paribus, therefore have lower welfare. We would like to know how damaging
to welfare is a given degree of price dispersion.
So, we would like to calculate a quantity of consumption, Φ%, which represents
the percentage point amount by which consumption would need to be higher every
period, to achieve the same level of utility as in the case when all firms charge the
same price, ∆v+1t+k = 1
4. To calculate this welfare equivalent we set
Ut
³
Φ,
nb∆t+ko´ = Et ∞X
t=0
βt+k
Ã
log(Ct+k) + logΦ− λt+k∆v+1t+k
¡
A−1t+kYt+k
¢(v+1)φ
v + 1
!
such that Ut
³
Φ,
nb∆t+ko´ = Ut(1, 0). Note that this calculation is quite general
as it may be interpreted as assuming that the optimal degree of price dispersion is
necessarily positive—that the policymaker is required to deliver a positive degree
of price dispersion perhaps most plausibly as a result of numerous sources of
nominal rigidity. Our calculation, therefore, reflects the remaining welfare cost of
such rigidities. It follows then that5
logΦ = (1− β)Et
∞X
t=0
βt+kλt+k
¡
A−1t+kYt+k
¢(v+1)φ
v + 1
;
=
λ
1 + v
Y (v+1)φ
¡
∆v+1 − 1
¢
=
1− τ
1− g
(θ − 1)
θφ (1 + v)
¡
∆v+1 − 1
¢
. (5.1)
This is what we are seeking: It shows by how much consumption would need to
be increased to compensate for a given degree of price dispersion in the economy.
4Of course, Lucas (1987) considered the mean-variance trade-oﬀ in consumption; our thought
experiment is trading oﬀ mean consumption and mean price dispersion.
5In formula (5.1) Y denotes the steady-state level of output, g denotes government
expenditure to output ratio and τ is the steady pay-roll tax rate. The Phillips curve (2.27)
and an assumption of price stability, help us to solve for the steady state output value
λY (v+1)φ = 1−τ1−g
θ−1
θφ .
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Table 5.1 provides details of the calculations based on this expression. The
required change in consumption appears far from negligible. Indeed, even on
relatively moderate assumptions that number does not fall below 0.5%, and may
rise substantially above it; column II, assuming a coeﬃcient of variation of prices
of 10%, implies a consumption equivalent of 2.2%.
Table 5.1 I II III IV V
cvar 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
θ 7 7 10 7 7
φ 1.38 1.3 1.38 1.6 1.38
∆t 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.16
g 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
τ 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.25 0.25
1 + ν 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
∆ν+1 − 1 2.8% 11.5% 16.4% 19.4% 52.3%
1−τ
1−g
1−θ
θφ(1+ν) 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.17 0.2
Φ% 0.5% 2.2% 3.1% 3.3% 10.2%
6. Optimal monetary policy under price dispersion
We now return to the problem of section 2.4. Following Tack Yun (2005), we
consider an economy with an initial degree of price dispersion, ∆t−1 > 1 and access
to lump-sum taxation (the full problem is set out and solved in the appendix). Yun
(2005) considers an economy with linear production, φ = 1,while we consider the
more general case of concave production technology. The next proposition shows
that optimization over price dispersion implies negative inflation in a transition
period. Lump sum taxes are employed to meet the solvency requirement attached
to the policy program. The price setting constraint in this case can be supported
by payroll subsidies, τ t+k. Yun (2005) shows that with competitive labour markets
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the optimal subsidy rate should correct for the distortion associated with imperfect
competition, τht+k = − 1(θ−1) .6
Proposition 6.1. (Tack Yun, 2005) Given initial price dispersion, the optimal
policy corresponds to negative inflation.
Proof. We can easily recover his result by writing the first-order condition for
the law of motion (2.28)
∂∆t
∂πt
= θφα
⎛
⎝∆t−1πθφ−1t −
µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶ θφ
θ−1−1
πθ−2t
⎞
⎠ = 0. (6.1)
We can simplify (6.1), which gives us the optimal rate of inflation
πt =
∙
(1− α)∆
θ−1
θφ+1−θ
t−1 + α
¸ 1
1−θ
. (6.2)
Clearly, this implies that πt < 1 iﬀ ∆t−1 > 1. Finally, this optimal path for
inflation is feasible: See the formal proof in the appendix.
Substituting the expression for optimal inflation (6.2) into the law of motion
(2.28) we obtain the optimal level of price dispersion to be achieved in the next
period
∆t = ∆t−1
h
(1− α) (∆t−1)
θ−1
θφ+1−θ + α
i θφ+1−θ
1−θ
, (6.3)
which implies the following dynamic relation between inflation and price
dispersion:
πθφ+1−θt =
∆t
∆t−1
. (6.4)
We emphasize that one still cannot recover an optimal stabilization policy for price
dispersion should one adopt a second-order approximation around a zero-inflation
6It is straightforward to demonstrate that when the labour market is imperfectly competitive,
as in Erceg et al., τht+k = 1 −
θµt+k
θ−1 and that this result holds for any φ > 1. Here µ refers to
the wage markup. An appendix is available from the authors.
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steady state. The logarithmic second-order approximation to the law of motion
is given by (6.5)
c∆t = α[∆t−1 + 1
2
α
1− αθφ (θφ+ 1− θ) bπ2t +O ¡°°ξ3°°¢ (6.5)
and the policy that minimizes price dispersion implies immediate inflation
stabilization: bπt = 0.
The usual linear-quadratic approach drops the law of motion (6.5) as a "second-
order constraint", and therefore does not allow one to investigate the dynamics of
price dispersion at all. As we noted in the introduction, this assumption lies at
the heart of the usual conclusion in the literature that the direct impact of price
dispersion on welfare is close to negligible.
7. Reincorporating price dispersion into linearized models
In economies with low inflation and no indexation, price dispersion has a large
impact on the economy and welfare. Optimal monetary policy, if it could, drives
price dispersion to zero. However, there may be good reasons to expect that it
cannot (for example, lack of enough policy tools—lump-sum taxation, as above,
fear of a liquidity trap, etc.). Hence, if optimal inflation is non-zero and pricing
behaviour cannot be fully synchronized, then some price distortion (in steady-state
and in the dynamics) is unavoidable.
The reason why price dispersion is generally excluded from linearized models
is because the linearization takes place around a steady state in which there is no
price dispersion7. In the previous sections we have tried to indicate that price
dispersion can be significant even at relatively low rates of inflation. In the
remainder of the paper, we develop a log-linear version of our model in which
7Of course, price dispersion may not be entirely absent in L-Q approximate models. That
is because price dispersion is the source of the inflation stabilization objective in quadratic
approximations to the representative agent’s utility function. See Woodford (2003).
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price dispersion is no longer of second-order importance. Crucially, we linearize
the model around an inflationary steady state in which there remains some price
dispersion.
First, consider price adjustment in the Calvo-Yun set-up. Each period firms
who are unable to reprice adjust their price for steady state inflation, π. Other
firms are allowed to adjust prices in a more sophisticated way, optimally choosing
their price. The aggregate price-level, (2.19) impliesÃ
1− α (πt/π)θ−1
1− α
! 1
1−θ
=
µ
p0t
Pt
¶
. (7.1)
Thus, the dynamics of price dispersion can be shown to be given by:
∆t =
Z 1
0
µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶−θφ
di
= α (πt/π)
θφ∆t−1 + (1− α)
Ã
1− α (πt/π)θ−1
1− α
! θφ
θ−1
, (7.2)
where π is steady-state inflation. See the appendix for the full derivation. The
steady state value of ∆ is given by
∆ = α (π/π)θϕ∆+ (1− α)
Ã
1− α (π/π)θ−1
1− α
! θϕ
θ−1
, (7.3)
which implies that ∆ = 1 in steady state. Hence, this is also consistent with the
case in which steady-state inflation is zero. Linearizing this expression around
this steady state results in (again, see the appendix for the details):
b∆t = αk b∆t−k +O2 ' O2.
O2 indicates terms of second-order, or higher. Now let us consider the
approximation to the law of motion around a steady state with positive inflation
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and no indexation. This seems a reasonable approach given that we observe little
or no indexation in low inflation economies and that most monetary authorities,
to put it mildly, do not seem to wish to achieve zero inflation. We find that
∆t = απ
θφ
t ∆t−1 + (1− α)
µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶ θφ
θ−1
. (7.4)
The steady state price dispersion is then
∆ =
(1− α)
(1− απθφ)
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ θφ
θ−1
. (7.5)
And what we now find is that
b∆t = απθφb∆t−1 + αθφ¡πθφ − πθ−1¢
(1− απθ−1) bπt +O2. (7.6)
So, price dispersion is not a second order term any longer. Hence an approximate
log-linear model will include price dispersion and it follows that: The law of motion
(7.6) has to be part of the linear system of the model’s equations; the inflation
rate which reduces price dispersion is necessarily below trend inflation, so that we
may recover a version of Yun’s (2005) result (although we do not pursue that issue
in this paper); price dispersion and inflation will directly aﬀect production costs
in the same way as a negative productivity shock. We now present the equations
of the full linearized model, with the details left to the appendix.
8. The log-linear model
1. The expression for the real wage (8.1) is obtained using (2.16)
bλt + v bNt + bCt = bwt + bst, (8.1)
where we define bst =\1− τ t.
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2. The log-linear form of labour demand is derived from (2.15):
bNt = c∆t + φ³bYt − bAt´ . (8.2)
3. Market clearing is derived using (2.24):
bYt = (1− g) bCt + g bGt. (8.3)
4. In the appendix we show how one can construct the following log-linear
form of the Phillips relation:
−Λ1 bπt − Λ2Zt + Λ3Xt = 0; (8.4)
Zt − bYt + bCt − θ − 1
1− αβπθ−1bπt = αβπθ−1EtZt+1; (8.5)
Xt− bwt+k+ bCt+k−φ³bYt+k − bAt+k´−µ θφ
1− αβπθφ
¶bπt+k = αβπθφEtXt+1. (8.6)
Λ1,Λ2 and Λ3 are parameters defined in the appendix, and where
Zt =
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)k
µbYt+k − bCt+k + θ − 1
1− αβπθ−1bπt+k
¶
;
Xt =
∞X
k=0
(αβπθφ)k
µbwt+k − bCt+k + φ³bYt+k − bAt+k´+µ θφ
1− αβπθφ
¶bπt+k¶ .
5. Approximating equation (2.8) yields
Et bCt+1 +Etbπt+1 = bCt +bit, (8.7)
where bit is the gross nominal interest rate, bit = log ¡βπ (1 + it)¢ .
6. We log linearize (8.8) to yield (8.9)
Etbtπt+1
1
1 + it−1
= bt−1 − τhtwtNt +Gt; (8.8)
b
C
β
³bbt +Etbπt+1 −dit−1´ = bCbbt−1 − τ wNC (τ − 1τ bst + bwt + bNt) + g1− g bGt. (8.9)
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7. The log-linear dynamics of price dispersion is
b∆t+1π−θφ − αθφ¡πθφ − πθ−1¢
(1− απθ−1) bπt+1 = αb∆t. (8.10)
To close the system we need to specify the actions of the fiscal and monetary
authorities.
8. Monetary policy may be taken to follow a simple Taylor-type rule:
bit = i∗t + (ψπ + 1)bπt + ψy bYt;
i∗t = ρi
∗
t−1 + bmt.
Here, bmt is a white-noise, serially uncorrelated shock; i∗t is an exogenous stochastic
process as in Woodford (2001) which reflects many potential factors such as shifts
in the natural rate of output, preference shocks, and such like, and we assume
ρ = 0.9, consistent with the analysis in Rudebusch (2002)8. There is some debate
about which output gap monetary authorities actually do react to, so in what
follows we simply set ψy = 0; in eﬀect we assume a simple Wicksell-Woodford
reaction function9. Had we set ψy = 0.5, none of our conclusions below would be
altered.
9. We assume that fiscal authorities respond to lagged debt in the following
way: bst = −ξbbt−1.
10. Productivity follows an AR(1) process with white-noise shock term:
bAt+1 = ρA bAt + εAt+1;
Full details of the calibration are in the appendix. First, we consider a shock to
the interest rate target. In each graph we compare the model with price dispersion
8In fact, Rudebusch’s results suggest that a value for ρ slightly higher than 0.9 is plausible.
9See Woodford (2003) chapter 4.
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(the solid line) with the model in which price dispersion is absent (broken line).
Figure 8.1 looks at how inflation and interest rates respond to our ‘nominal’ shock.
Following the target interest rate shock inflation falls in both model economies,
but by more in the no-price-dispersion (npd) model. More interestingly, it follows
a hump-shaped path in the economy with price dispersion (pd), and appears to
be more persistent. The lower panel of Figure 8.1 shows that this hump-shaped
pattern shows up in the path of interest rates, which are thus somewhat more
smoothed than one observes in the npd model; that is, the initial changes in
interest rates are somewhat more gradual.
The impact of this shock on price dispersion is persistent and long-lasting (top
panel, Figure 8.2). Although Proposition 3.1 above was established taking as
given the level of output, it provides some clues as to the implications of this fall
in price dispersion. Producers anticipate a persistent decline in price dispersion
and as a result a period of lower than average production costs. This means that
firms increase production (so that equilibrium production costs actually rise). As
a result, labour input (top panel Figure 8.3) rises as does output (lower panel,
Figure 8.3).
The rise in output in the pd economy is again hump-shaped and is a rather
striking finding. The reduction in price dispersion, from a distorted steady-state,
acts like a positive productivity shock, so long as the change in the target rate
is suﬃciently persistent. And it is this increase in output (and hence demand)
that accounts for the smaller initial fall in inflation in the pd economy. This
result is somewhat reminiscent of the disinflationary booms found by Ball (1994),
Ireland (1997) and Nicolae and Nolan (2006). We stress, however, that our result
is distinct in the sense that both economies (i.e., the pd and the npd economies)
will display the behaviour identified by Ball for a future anticipated tightening in
monetary policy; the channel we have identified is over and above that identified
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by Ball.
Less persistent shocks to the target rate, ceteris paribus, tend to make inflation
persistence less pronounced, although the hump-shaped pattern to interest rates
may still be present.
Following a productivity shock inflation and interest rates again follow the
hump-shaped path back to base (Figure 8.4). The deviation of price dispersion is
again persistent (top panel, Figure 8.5), whilst output responds maximally in the
first period in both model economies (lower panel, Figure 8.6).
We conclude that the expected impact of a nominal shock looks to be highly
dependent on both the persistence of that shock and on the steady state from
which the economy is perturbed. If that steady state is distorted by what appears
to be an empirically plausible amount of relative price dispersion (here we assumed
an economy with a trend inflation of 2.5% and no indexation) then one may obtain
some surprising results. By incorporating price dispersion, we are able to account
for a persistent and gradual response in inflation to two familiar types of shocks.
However, the response of output to a persistent, contractionary ‘nominal’ shock
is striking and further work is required to understand this and reconcile it with
how one typically thinks the economy responds to such a shock.
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Peristent monetary shock: impact on price dispersion
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Peristent productivity shock: impact on inflation
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9. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to clarify the impact of price dispersion in a simple
economic environment. We went to some eﬀort to try to establish a rough order
of magnitude for price dispersion. We found that the impact of price dispersion,
on welfare and the dynamics of the simple model we set out, is substantial. Our
model with price dispersion seemed to make the economy evolve in a more sluggish
manner than the model with no price dispersion. Notably, inflation followed a
hump-shaped path following either a real or a persistent nominal shock, and so
any observed persistence in the policy rate was ultimately due to the persistence in
the nominal shock, and not ‘sluggish’ policy decisions. These sorts of issues have
been of concern to quantitative theorists recently; see the insightful discussion
in Mash (2004). However, the expansionary impact on output of a persistent
nominal contraction may be a challenge for the positive properties of the set-
up. A number of research questions appear important. It would be especially
interesting to have a better feel for how dispersed are actual prices through time,
how that changes with inflation and the persistence of actual monetary shocks.
Also, to slow the response of output one may think of incorporating sticky wages,
as it seems reasonable to suppose that this will stop production costs from falling
so quickly following a monetary contraction. Incorporating learning may also be
useful in this regard10.
10Nicolae and Nolan (2006) showed in a related, but simpler, model to the one presented
here that one could ‘avoid’ disinflationary booms by incorporating a period of learning into the
model.
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10. Appendix
10.1. Appendix to section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. The Ramsey plan is a policy plan
©
Pt+k, τht+k,
ª∞
k=0
which is a
competitive equilibrium corresponding to Definition 2.1 and which maximizes
(2.1). We recall that a competitive equilibrium is a path for endogenous
variables
©
Ct+k, Yt+k, Nt+k, wt+k, ∆t+k, p0t+k, Pt+k,
ª∞
k=0
satisfying conditions
(2.16), (2.15), (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), (2.23) and (2.24). To receive a simpler system
we will first substitute for Yt+k, Nt+k, wt+k using (2.16), (2.15) and (2.24). This
operation will immediately result in revised expressions for social welfare (2.25),
the solvency constraint (2.26) and the Phillips Curve (10.1)
(p0t/Pt)
−θ+θφ+1Et
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
Ct+k +Gt+k
Ct+k
(1− θ)
µ
Pt
Pt+k
¶1−θ
(10.1)
= θφEt
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
λt+k
1− τht+k
∆vpt+k
¡
A−1t+k (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φµ Pt
Pt+k
¶−θφ
.
Then, using (2.19) we can calculate the optimal relative price,
p0t/Pt =
µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶ 1
1−θ
, (10.2)
which can be plugged into (2.20) to receive the law of motion as in (2.28). Finally,
we plug (10.2) into the transformed Phillips curve (10.1) to receive (2.27).
10.1.1. The relationship between the coeﬃcient of variation and the
measurement of price dispersion: derivation of (4.2)
We recall that ∆t h−θφi is our measure of price dispersion
∆t h−θφi =
Z µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶−θφ
di. (10.3)
37
For any x relation (10.4) is true up to second order:
∆t hxi = 1 + x
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´ di+ 1
2
x2
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´2 di+O3. (10.4)
Furthermore, from the definition of average price (2.3) implies that
∆t h1− θi = 1, which together with (10.4) gives (10.5)Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´ di = θ − 1
2
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´2 di+O3. (10.5)
In turn, expression (10.5) and (10.4) result in (10.6)
∆t hxi = 1 + x
2
(θ − 1 + x)
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´2 di+O3, (10.6)
which can be rewritten as (10.7) for x = −θφ
∆t h−θφi ' 1 + 1
2
θφ (θ (φ− 1)− 1)
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´2 di (10.7)
By definition, the coeﬃcient of variation is the ratio of standard deviation to
mean. Formally
cvar =
³R
p2t (i)di−
¡R
pt(i)di
¢2´1/2R
pt(i)di
=
=
µR ³p(i)
Pt
´2
di−
³R p(i)
Pt
di
´2¶1/2
R p(i)
Pt
di
,
which we rewrite as (10.8)
cvar =
p
∆t h2i−∆2t h1i
∆t h1i , (10.8)
where we can express ∆t h2i and ∆t h1i using relation (10.6)
∆t h2i = 1 + (θ + 1)
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´2 di+O3; (10.9)
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∆t h1i = 1 + θ
2
Z ³bpt(i)− bPt´2 di+O3. (10.10)
Combining (10.9) and (10.10) we receive
∆t h1i ' 1 + 1
2
θ
θ + 1
(∆t h2i− 1) . (10.11)
Expressions (10.8) and (10.11) help us to relate ∆t h2i and the coeﬃcient of
variation, cvar: ¡
cvar2 + 1
¢µ
1 +
1
2
θ
θ + 1
(∆t h2i− 1)
¶
= ∆t h2i ,
cvar2 +
1
2
θ
θ + 1
(∆t h2i− 1)
¡
cvar2 + 1
¢
= ∆t h2i− 1
cvar2
1− 1
2
θ
θ+1 (cvar
2 + 1)
= ∆t h2i− 1 (10.12)
Finally, we can combine (10.6) and (10.9) to receive (10.13)
∆t h−θφi ' 1 + 1
2
θφ
θ + 1
(θφ− θ + 1) (∆t h2i− 1) . (10.13)
Now, plugging (10.12) into (10.13) we receive the final expression, (4.2), used in
the main text,
∆t h−θφi ' 1 + 1
2
θφ
θ + 1
(θφ− θ + 1) cvar
2
1− 1
2
θ
θ+1 (cvar
2 + 1)
.
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10.2. Appendix to Section 6
The Lagrangian for the Ramsey policy problem may be written as:
L = Et
∞X
k=0
βk
Ã
log (Ct+k)− λt+k∆v+1t+k
¡
A−1t (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φ
v + 1
!
+ψ
"
(1 + it−1)
bt−1
Ctπt
−Et
∞X
k=0
βk
Ã
τht+kλt+k∆
v+1
pt+k
1− τht+k
µ
Ct+k +Gt+k
At+k
¶(v+1)φ
− Gt+k + Tt+k
Ct+k
!#
µh
µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ
Et
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
Ct+k +Gt+k
Ct+k
µ
Pt
Pt+k
¶1−θ
−
− θ
(1− θ)φEt
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
Ã
λt+k
1− τht+k
∆vt+k
¡
A−1t+k (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φµ Pt
Pt+k
¶−θφ!
+Et
∞X
k=0
βkηt+k
⎛
⎝∆t+k − α∆t+k−1πθφt+k − (1− α)
Ã
1− απθ−1t+k
1− α
! θφ
θ−1
⎞
⎠
The first order condition with respect to Tt, implies that the solvency constraint
is not binding, ψ = 0. Similarly, the first order condition with respect to τht+k,
implies that price-setting curve is not binding either so that µ = 0; we can
always ‘correct’ it by adjusting the labour tax/subsidy rate, τht+k. The first order
condition with respect to consumption implies (10.14)
Ct+k +Gt+k
Ct+k
= φλt+k∆v+1t+k
¡
A−1t (Ct+k +Gt+k)
¢(v+1)φ
v + 1
(10.14)
which implies that consumption is bigger when price dispersion is smaller. Finally,
the first order condition with respect to πt gives us expression (6.2), which together
with the law of motion (2.28) impliesµ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ
= ∆t. (10.15)
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From equation (6.4) we derive the following dynamic relationship between the
level of price dispersion and average price inflation
Pt
Pt+k
=
µ
∆t
∆t+k
¶ 1
θφ+1−θ
. (10.16)
Now we plug (10.14) ,(10.15) and (10.16) into the price setting curve (2.27)
and receive condition (10.17)
0 = ∆tEt
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
Ct+k +Gt+k
Ct+k
µ
∆t
∆t+k
¶ 1−θ
θφ+1−θ
− (10.17)
− θ
(θ − 1)Et
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
∆−1t+k
1− τht+k
(Ct+k +Gt+k)
Ct+k
µ
∆t
∆t+k
¶ −θφ
θφ+1−θ
=
Et
∞X
k=0
(βα)k
Ct+k +Gt+k
Ct+k
∆t
µ
∆t
∆t+k
¶ 1−θ
θφ+1−θ
µ
1− θ
(1− θ)
1
1− τ t+k
¶
which is always true if τ t+k = 1− θ1−θ .
This proves that when the solvency constraint is not binding, the optimal
policy minimizes price dispersion.
10.2.1. The Law of motion for the Calvo-Yun model
The dynamic of price dispersion is derived as follows:
∆t =
Z 1
0
µ
pt(i)
Pt
¶−θφ
di
= α
Z 1
0
µ
pt−1(i)π
Pt
¶−θφ
+ (1− α)
Z 1
0
µ
p0t
Pt
¶−θφ
= α (πt/π)
θφ
Z 1
0
µ
pt−1(i)
Pt−1
¶−θφ
+ (1− α)
µ
p0t
Pt
¶−θφ
= α (πt/π)
θφ∆t−1 + (1− α)
Ã
1− α (πt/π)θ−1
1− α
! θφ
θ−1
,
where π is steady-state inflation.
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10.3. The approximate relationship around π
∆t = α (πt/π)
θφ∆t−1 + (1− α)
Ã
1− α (πt/π)θ−1
1− α
! θφ
θ−1
³
1 + b∆t´ = α (1 + θφbπt) (1 + b∆t−1)
+(1− α)
µ
1 +
θφ
θ − 1
µ
\1− α (πt/π)θ−1
¶¶
+O2
where µ
\1− α (πt/π)θ−1
¶
= −αbπt θ − 1
1− α +O2
and therefore
b∆t = α³θφbπt + b∆t−1´− (1− α) θφθ − 1αbπt θ − 11− α +O2
b∆t = αb∆t−1 +O2
Since our variables are bounded, backward recursive substitution leads us to
conclude that price dispersion is of second-order significance.
11. Calibration
Our baseline settings are as follows: Preference parameters: v = 1.8, λ = 1,
β = 0.96. Technology parameters: φ = 1.38, θ = 7, α = 0.5. Fiscal policy in
a steady state: b/Y = 0.4, g = 0.15. Monetary policy parameters: ψπ = 0.5,
ξ = 0.1. Persistence of stochastic shocks: ρA = 0.9.
The model is linearized around two steady states, one where steady-state price
dispersion is zero, and inflation is zero, and another where inflation is 2.5% and
there is price dispersion in steady state: i.e., π = 1, or π = 1.025.
42
12. Steady states of the model
As we explained in the text, when the model is linearized around a non-inflationary
steady state, the law of motion for price dispersion is dropped as price dispersion
is a second-order variable. However, if we consider the model with a small
yet positive trend inflation and no indexation then price dispersion is of first-
order importance. Moreover it impacts on the model economy like a negative
productivity shock and in addition to being persistent it also increases with
inflation.
13. Appendices to Section 8
13.1. The steady state
First, for any given level of the steady state inflation, π, we can find price
dispersion using the law of motion equation (2.28)
∆ =
(1− α)
(1− απθφ)
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ θφ
θ−1
.
Without loss of generality we assume the following normalization in the steady
state of the economy A = 1, λ = 1. Then, we may calculate the steady-state value
of output from the Phillips Curve (2.18).µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶1−θ+θφ
1−θ 1
1− αβπθ−1
1
1− g =
µ
θφ
θ − 1
¶
1
1− αβπθφ
w
1− gY
ϕ−1. (13.1)
Where g is the government consumption to GDP ratio, g = G/Y.
The steady state labour supply and real wage follow from (2.15) and (2.16):
N = ∆Y φ;
w =
1
1− τhλCN
v =
1− g
1− τhλY N
v =
1− g
1− τ λ∆
vY φv+1.
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These allow us to compute output as a function of the steady state tax rate, τ ;
1
1− g
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ 1−θ+θφ
1−θ 1− αβπθφ
1− αβπθ−1
µ
θ − 1
φθ
¶
=
λ∆vY φ(v+1)
1− τ . (13.2)
From the solvency constraint (2.26) we can then relate the debt to GDP ratio to
the levels of tax and output
b
C
(1− β) = τ
1− τ λ
¡
∆Y φ
¢v+1 − g
1− g . (13.3)
Combining the Phillips curve (13.2) and the solvency constraint (13.3) we receive
the equilibrium level of output
b
C
(1− β) + g
1− g + λ
¡
∆Y φ
¢v+1
=
1
1− g
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ 1−θ+θφ
1−θ
∆
1− αβπθφ
1− αβπθ−1
µ
θ − 1
φθ
¶
.
13.2. Appendix 2: Linearization of the Phillips curve
A convenient way to linearize the Phillips curve is as follows. First re-write
expression (2.18) as follows, rebundling the terms in current-period inflation:µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶1−θ+θφ
1−θ
π1−θ+θφt (13.4)
∞X
k=0
(αβ)kEt
Yt+k
Ct+k
£
(Pt−1/Pt+k)1−θ
¤
(13.5)
=
µ
θ
θ − 1
¶ ∞X
k=0
(αβ)kφEt
wt+k
Ct+k
µ
Yt+k
At+k
¶φ
(Pt−1/Pt+k)−θφ. (13.6)
Hence, linearizing the first expression above (13.4):µ
1− απθ−1t
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ
π1−θ+θφt
=
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ θφ
1−θ
π1−θ+θφ
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α +
−θ + θφ+ 1
1− α bπt
¶
.
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Similarly, linearizing the second expression (13.5):
∞X
k=0
(αβ)kEt
Yt+k
Ct+k
£
(Pt−1/Pt+k)1−θ
¤
=
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)k
πθ−1
1− gEt
Ã
1 + bYt+k − bCt+k + (θ − 1) kX
i=0
bπt+i!
=
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)k
πθ−1
1− gEt
³bYt+k − bCt+k´+ 1
1− αβπθ−1
πθ−1
1− g
+
πθ−1 (θ − 1)
1− g
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)kEt
kX
i=0
bπt+i (13.7)
We may change the order of integration in the last line of (13.7)
:
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)kEt
kX
i=0
bπt+i = ∞EtX
i=0
∞X
k=i
bπt+i(αβπθ−1)k
=
∞
Et
X
i=0
bπt+i ∞X
k=i
(αβπθ−1)k =
1
1− αβπθ−1Et
∞X
i=0
(αβπθ−1)kbπt+k.
And so we find that:
∞X
k=0
(αβ)k
Yt+k
Ct+k
£
(Pt−1/Pt+k)1−θ
¤
=
1
1− g
" ∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)k
µbYt+k − bCt+k + 1
1− αβπθ−1
θ − 1
1− gbπt+k
¶
+
1
1− αβπθ−1
#
.(13.8)
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Hence, the product of (the approximations of) expressions (13.4) and (13.5) isµ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ θφ
1−θ
πθφ
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α +
−θ + θφ+ 1
1− α bπt
¶
1
1− g ×
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)kEt
µbYt+k − bCt+k + 1
1− αβπθ−1
θ − 1
1− gbπt+k
¶
+
1
1− αβπθ−1
=
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ θφ
1−θ −θ + θφ+ 1
1− α
π1−θ+θφ
1− αβπθ−1
1
1− g bπt
+
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶ θφ+1−θ
1−θ π1−θ+θφ
(1− g)2
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)kEt
µbYt+k − bCt+k + 1
1− αβπθ−1
θ − 1
1− gbπt+k
¶
.
We turn now to the third component (13.6) of the Phillips curve:µ
θ
θ − 1
¶ ∞X
k=0
(αβ)kφEt
wt+k
Ct+k
µ
Yt+k
At+k
¶φ
(Pt−1/Pt+k)−θφ
=
µ
θ
θ − 1
¶
φwY φπθφ
C (1− g)
∞X
k=0
(αβπθφ)kEt
µbwt+k − bCt+k + φ³bYt+k − bAt+k´+µ θφ
1− αβπθφ
¶bπt+k¶ .
And so, the log linearization of the Phillips curve is completed asµ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ πθφ
1− αβπθ−1
−θ + θφ+ 1
1− απθ−1 bπt
+
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ
πθφ
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)kEt
µbYt+k − bCt+k + θ − 1
1− αβπθ−1bπt+k
¶
=
µ
θφ
θ − 1
¶
wY φ−1πθφ
∞X
k=0
(αβπθφ)kEt
µbwt+k − bCt+k + φ³bYt+k − bAt+k´+ θφ
1− αβπθφbπt+k
¶
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We use the following notational simplifications:
Λ1 : = Λ2
1
1− αβπθ−1
−θ + θφ+ 1
1− απθ−1 ;
Λ2 : =
µ
1− απθ−1
1− α
¶−θ+θφ+1
1−θ
;
Λ3 =
µ
θφ
θ − 1
¶
w
Y φ
C
(1− g) ;
Zt =
∞X
k=0
(αβπθ−1)kEt
µbYt+k − bCt+k + θ − 1
1− αβπθ−1bπt+k
¶
;
Xt =
∞X
k=0
(αβπθφ)kEt
µbwt+k − bCt+k + φ³bYt+k − bAt+k´+µ θφ
1− αβπθϕ
¶bπt+k¶ .
The following bloc of equations thus comprise our Phillips relation:
−Λ1 bπt − Λ2Zt + Λ3Xt = 0;
Zt − bYt + bCt − θ − 1
1− αβπθ−1bπt = αβπθ−1EtZt+1;
Xt − bwt + bCt − φ³bYt − bAt´− θφ
1− αβπθφbπt = αβπθφEtXt+1.
When π = 1, we see that Λ3 = 1 and Λ2 = 1, and therefore we can recover a
‘standard’ Phillips relation:
bπt − κbYt + µµbst − bλt + g
1− g
bGt + (1 + v)φ bAt¶ = βEtdπt+1,
where we define
µ =
(1− αβ) (1− α)
−θ + θφ+ 1 ;
κ = µ
µ
(v + 1)φ+
g
1− g
¶
.
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